News & Reviews News Wire NTSB interviews engineer of Amtrak Cascades train No. 501 NEWSWIRE

NTSB interviews engineer of Amtrak Cascades train No. 501 NEWSWIRE

By Angela Cotey | January 25, 2018

| Last updated on November 3, 2020

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The remains of Amtrak Cascades train No. 501 in December 2017.
Steve Carter
WASHINGTON — As part of its ongoing investigation into the Dec. 18, 2017, derailment of an Amtrak passenger train in DuPont, Washington, the National Transportation Safety Board released Thursday an update about the agency’s investigation.

NTSB investigators interviewed the engineer and the qualifying conductor, who were in the lead locomotive during the accident trip. Both suffered serious injuries as a result of the derailment and were not able to be interviewed until the week of Jan. 15, 2018. The following information is among that provided by the engineer and qualifying conductor during interviews with NTSB investigators:

• The engineer, a 55-year-old male, was hired by Amtrak in 2004 as a conductor and then promoted to locomotive engineer in 2013.

• In the five weeks preceding the derailment, the engineer had qualified on the Point Defiance Bypass section of track following the completion of seven to 10 observational trips in the locomotive as well as three trips operating the equipment, two northbound and one southbound.

• The engineer said he felt rested at the start of his shift.

• The engineer recalled that as the train passed milepost 15.5 it was traveling about 79 mph.

• The engineer told investigators that he was aware that the curve with the 30 mph speed restriction was at milepost 19.8, and that he had planned to initiate braking about one mile prior to the curve.

• The engineer said that he saw mileposts 16 and 17 but didn’t recall seeing milepost 18 or the 30 mph advance speed sign, which was posted two miles ahead of the speed-restricted curve.

• The engineer said that he did see the wayside signal at milepost 19.8 (at the accident curve) but mistook it for another signal, which was north of the curve.

• He said that as soon as he saw the 30 mph sign at the start of the curve, he applied brakes.Seconds later, the train derailed as it entered the curve.

• The engineer said that he didn’t feel that having a qualifying conductor in the locomotive with him was a distraction.

• The engineer also said that he would not have gotten behind the throttle if he had any reservations about his readiness to operate the train.

• The qualifying conductor, a 48-year-old male, was hired by Amtrak in 2010 as an assistant conductor and was promoted to conductor in 2011.

• At start of shift, he said he took part in the job briefing conducted by the conductor and the engineer. They went over general track bulletins and other items.

• The qualifying conductor told investigators that he felt rested and alert at the start of his shift. He had never worked with the engineer before. He told investigators that the engineer appeared alert during the job briefing and while operating the train.

• The qualifying conductor told investigators that there was minimal conversation between himself and the engineer during the trip. Instead he said he spent time looking at his paperwork to help learn the territory.

• Just prior to the derailment, the qualifying conductor said he looked down at his copies of the general track bulletins. He then heard the engineer say or mumble something. He then looked up and sensed that the train was becoming “airborne.”

These accounts by the crewmembers in the lead locomotive of the accident train are just two sources of information that will be considered as the investigation progresses. In the coming weeks, investigators will compare these accounts with video captured from the inward- and outward-facing locomotive cameras, information from the locomotive event data recorder and other sources.

In addition to human performance and operations, investigators are continuing to develop information in a wide range of areas, including signals and train control, track and engineering, mechanical, crashworthiness, survival factors, and recorders.

The investigation is expected to last 12 to 24 months.

More information is available online.

— A National Transportation Safety Board news release. Jan. 25, 2018.

10 thoughts on “NTSB interviews engineer of Amtrak Cascades train No. 501 NEWSWIRE

  1. I wonder if, even without PTC, a block signal requiring a reduction to ‘prepare to stop’ speed would have prevented the derailment. Sounds like the engineer missed a 30mph sign before the curve (in the dark?), but a permanent light signal would have been hard to miss.

  2. Charles Stark, I disagree with your comment contrasting this to Brian Bostian’s situation and comment. If you read the details of the Philadelphia crash here, about a third of the way down, in the paragraph Bolded beginning “At around 9:17 PM” :

    https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/31/magazine/the-wreck-of-amtrak-188.html?smid=pl-share&_r=1

    you’ll see that Mr Bostian had correctly accelerated but then forgot to decelerate and “could not remember” why he did not. No different than this engineer saying he “didn’t recall” seeing the MP 18 or the 30 MPH sign. Both are simple examples of how easy it is for a human being to briefly lose situational awareness. I am far from an expert on RR signals, but didn’t /don’t locomotives have In-Cab signals to tell the engineer when to stop? (or slow up)? I can’t believe that lives are dependent on one human being not missing a sign as he flies by at 80 MPH. Is there no GPS in the loco?

  3. It took a big man to admit his mistake, unlike Brian Bostian who “didn’t remember” why he accelerated to 100 mph on the NEC when he lost track of where he was.

  4. “seven to 10 observational trips in the locomotive” Why would he not have a record of each of his runs and have the correct count? Did they not give him time to see his time books? Strange that is not a precise answer. It was not very old history, it was current work. Only had one southbound run before being assigned with revenue seem like a bad plan. The report here did not confirm who was sitting where in the locomotive and why did he miss seeing the speed sign. What inter cab action cause that?

  5. Seems odd that the conductor trainee “spent time looking at his paperwork to help learn the territory” following the job briefing and while the train was underway. Wonder why NTSB didn’t state what the conductor trainee saw or didn’t see re: speed limit warning sign at mp 18…

  6. Why was there only one reduced speed sign?

    In the absence of PTS, there is relatively inexpensive, readily available and quick to install piece of technology that could have helped: one of those flashing radar speed signs that police use to warn drivers that they are over the speed limit. Put a couple of those ahead of the curve. Not foolproof, but they could help. It’s a lot harder to ignore than a simple sign.

    Here’s the cheapest one I could find, under $3000:
    http://www.globalindustrial.com/p/safety/signs/parking-traffic/sp100-11-radar-feedback-sign-4-cell-battery-powered-yellow-sign-128071?infoParam.campaignId=T9F&gclid=Cj0KCQiAwKvTBRC2ARIsAL0Dgk1zgQKsMbMNgfnjYZyV_IqnvqAeRoKbEZWjJJ0O5FrmrWpmPhDd0ioaApI1EALw_wcB

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