News & Reviews News Wire Railfans document near-miss in Fostoria on Sunday NEWSWIRE

Railfans document near-miss in Fostoria on Sunday NEWSWIRE

By Angela Cotey | November 30, 2015

| Last updated on November 3, 2020

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CSX3179
The two trains remained by the diamond after the incident during the investigation. This view looks east from the Fostoria Railpark.
FOSTORIA, Ohio – Railfans watching trains at the popular Fostoria Railpark believe they nearly witnessed a collision between two trains Sunday at the famous diamond crossing between CSX Transportation and Norfolk Southern in northwest Ohio.

Sources close to the railroads identify the trains involved as NS 66N, a loaded eastbound ethanol train with Union Pacific power, and CSX Q355, a mixed manifest operating between Willard and Walbridge.

Fans watching tell Trains News Wire that Q355 was operating westbound and took a connecting track by F Tower to turn north to Walbridge. At the same time, 66N was operating eastbound on the NS main. Westbound NS train 412 just cleared the diamond before the near miss incident.

An eyewitness, a former railroad employee who asked not to be named, says both trains made an emergency brake application and were able to avert a collision. After seeing the CSX train approaching the diamond, “the NS train hit the air right about Poplar Street,” the next grade crossing to the west, he said. “CSX landed about 50 feet from NS.”

Norfolk Southern spokesman David Pidgeon confirms the witness accounts. “An eastbound NS train approached the diamond at Fostoria with a clear signal, and when the crew spotted a northbound CSX train approaching the diamond, the NS crew put their train into an emergency brake (application),” he tells Trains News Wire.

According to the witness, both NS trains were lined through town. He then heard a horn “on the B&O side,” referencing CSX’s former Baltimore & Ohio main line through the city, and walked to the south side of the park to get a better look. But he was surprised to see the CSX train “take the transfer (track) to Wally World,” local nickname for the CSX yard in Walbridge, near Toledo. It was then he realized there might be trouble brewing.

The witness said he was surprised at how quickly both trains were able to stop. His first thought was to flee, knowing a derailment could block the only vehicle access from the park.

Accounts from the scene indicate that it took about an hour for officials from both railroads to arrive.

CSX spokesman Rob Doolittle says the company is investigating the incident.

Other trains in the area were delayed while the crews inspected their trains and waited for company officials to arrive. Those trains seeing delays included T700, Q015, K635, Q151, E843, Q148, K148, L090, Q090, and Q136 on CSX.

In March, CSX closed F Tower, which had controlled trackage around the city since it opened in 1950. The IP dispatcher in Indianapolis now controls train movements through the city. For more on F Tower, see the August 2015 issue of Trains Magazine.

22 thoughts on “Railfans document near-miss in Fostoria on Sunday NEWSWIRE

  1. #614, August 14, 2015 was the NKP/B&O almost event. Safety, safety, safety. Can it be returned to Fostoria? 100+ main line freight trains per day. Let's think about the percentages and place safety higher on the list !!

  2. Being a Fostoria resident and visting the Iron Triangle railpark almost daily, this is the THIRD ALMOST collision in Fostoria since F-Tower was closed. Each one has ALMOST occurred at each diamond, B&O/C&O—NKP/B&O– and this one at the NKP/C&O. F-Tower needs to be reopened. Human eyes are much better to view these issues in Fostoria rather than a computer. THESE "almosts" did not occur prior to the tower being closed. Safety should be top on the list, not stockholders $$$ !!! I have a photo of the May event as I was there. The other one, will have to confirm the date, but railfans were there. These "almosts" cannot continue!

  3. to Mr. Harold Krewer: you are quite incorrect. these are not the boobs writing in to the L.A.Times or Wash Post 'letters to the editor' section. this is a TRAINS magazine news forum, commonly read by many who are quite technically knowledgeable to comment on things of this nature. a few boobs, yes, but many experts commenting with inside knowledge and expertise.

  4. Mr. Meyer has outlined an analysis that is sound. As a professional railroader, I know of which I speak. In my 38 year career, only one incident comes to mind of an error in design. All others were due to human factors. Therefore, my submission that this incident was likely human error. This statement does not dismiss the possibility that there was a software or signal design error.

  5. What, thunderbolts hurled from Heaven by "professional" railroaders?

    I concur with Mr Dupee in that a properly designed, properly working interlocking must NEVER, EVER allow a path to be set up that conflicts with an already established ("locked-in") path for a crossing movement without keeping the signal that protects the interlocking on "Stop" until all crossing trains have left the interlocking.

    So one (or more) of the following things must have occurred:
    1) The interlocking (which nowadays is likely a piece of software) was not properly designed
    2) The interlocking was not properly built (software and/or signalling equipment)
    3) The interlocking was not functioning properly
    4) The interlocking was somehow overridden
    5) Some piece of signalling equipment was malfunctioning
    6) One of the crews involved "ran a red light", or in British parlance, produced a "SPAD" (Signal Passed At Danger).

    1 – 5 would mean a serious technical issue that could have wide-ranging consequences (if it hasn't worked right there and at that time, where else might it happen again?). 6 would be the classic human error not guarded against by any sort of "automatic train stop" equipment at the interlocking in question. That's one of the gaps the PTC systems are intended to close.

  6. One thing I'm positive about is NONE of you are qualified to be drawing ANY conclusions about who or what is at fault.

  7. No. It's no politician's fault. That's an irrelevant comment. Regardless of dispatcher actions, interlockings are designed to preclude the authorization of conflicting routes. This is likely human error. Even though one of the crews will be taking some unscheduled time off, the good news is that no collision occurred. Taking into account that one of the trains was loaded with ethanol, this could have been much, much worse.

  8. There must be something wrong with the interlocking circuitry, if they got rid of the tower, is has to be automatic. But Im not positive about that or the dispatching.

  9. I don't think if this derailed it would be the only way out of the park… More than one way to get in and out by vehicle

  10. Interlockings are supposed to prevent this. Hmmm. Something is messed up somewhere. Kudos to the crews for acting fast and preventing a possible catastrophe.

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