In general terms, America is not a country with great affinity for nationalization. The machinations of the American economy are diametrically opposed to the principles of nationalization. However, that doesn’t mean that the U.S. has never dabbled in the practice. The United States Railroad Administration (USRA) is an example.
In the interest of clarity, I’ll say this up front: This article will be focused on the United States Railroad Administration, not the United States Railroad Association. The United States Railroad Administration operated from 1917 to 1920, while the United States Railroad Association operated from 1974 to 1986. These separate governmental bodies are often confused due to their shared acronym.
History of the USRA
The USRA was born under a unique confluence of circumstances. Prior even to American involvement in the First World War, the economic conditions of the early 20th century were already stressing the nation’s railroads. Ownership of the American rail network, which comprised more than 250,000 miles of track, was split up among over 400 individual companies, many of which were in receivership.
Onto this quagmire so sprung the outbreak of a continent-wide war in Europe in 1914. America, a burgeoning manufacturing powerhouse on the international stage at this point in the early 20th century, was the ideal suitor to meet the staggering industrial and material demands of this new war. The American industrial capacity was activated, primarily in support of the nations allied in opposition to the Central Powers. However, for the early years of the First World War, America stayed officially neutral.
Unsurprisingly, this acceleration in domestic production placed even greater stress on America’s already distressed rail network. Quickly, shipments were slowed down due to the increased rail network traffic and the poor quality of logistics management on the rail network. This problem was most evident at America’s ports, particularly those on the east coast. As Francis A. March wrote in his book History of the World’s War, published in 1919:
“Thousands of loaded cars had to stand for long periods awaiting the transfer of their contents to ships. This meant that thousands of cars which had been taken from lines in other parts of the country would be in a traffic blockade for weeks at a time. The main difficulty appeared to be that of getting trains unloaded promptly.”
The official neutrality of the United States would not last. Following an appearance of President Woodrow Wilson before a joint session of Congress, wherein the President officially requested that Congress declare war on Germany, the U.S. entered the war in early April of 1917. Suddenly, a greater urgency fell upon the American war production effort, an urgency which the railroads were ultimately unable to meet.
As this crisis was unfolding on America’s rail lines, the individual railroads, realizing the threat which this issue posed to their businesses, attempted to avert disaster and regain control of a situation which it was quickly losing. The remedy which the railroads attempted was called the Railroad War Board, which aimed to increase coordination between some of the largest railroads to reduce friction and optimize logistics as best as they were able. Already extant labor issues were exacerbated by military enlistment, resulting in already understaffed railroads with further depleted workforces being stretched even thinner by rising demand.
This measure was met with limited success, though, and in late 1917, the Interstate Commerce Commission recommended federal control of the nation’s struggling railroads.
Wilson’s Proclamation 1419
Using the Army Appropriations Act of 1916, President Wilson signed Proclamation 1419—Government Assumption of Control of Transportation Systems in December of 1917.
This proclamation stated in part:
“Now, Therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by the foregoing resolutions and statute, and by viture of all other powers thereto me enabling, do hereby, through Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, take possession and assume control at 12 o’clock noon on the twenty-eight day of December, 1917, of each and every system of transportation and the appurtenances thereof locat ed wholly or in part within the boundaries of the cont inental United States and consisting of railroads, and owned or controlled systems of coastwise and inland transportation, engaged in general transportation, whether operated by steam or by electric power, including also terminals, terminal companies and terminal associations, sleeping and parlor cars, private cars and private car lines, elevators, warehouses, telegraph and telephone lines and all other equipment and appurtenances commonly used upon or operated as a part of such rail or combined rail and water systems of transportation; – to the end that such systems of transportation be utilized for the transfer and transportation of troops, war material and equipment, to the exclusion so far as may be necessary of all other traffic thereon; and that so far as such exclusive use be not necessary or desirable, such systems of transportation be operated and utilized in the performance of such other services as the national interest may require and of the usual and ordinary business and duties of common carriers.”
With this proclamation, the United States Railroad Administration was created. Changes were made quickly. Operations were centralized in two large cities: New York City and Chicago. Chicago, with its already robust rail infrastructure and centralized location, served as the main hub for the railroads themselves. New York City, with its vast ports, was the primary outlet for much of the nation’s wartime production.
Locomotives: USRA’s legacy
While this new Federal control of rail logistics was effective in streamlining freight processes, the increase in production still left a deficit in available rolling stock. Quite simply, there were more war materials being produced than could be moved even with the newly efficient logistics. The USRA set out to remedy this by designing and eventually manufacturing locomotives.
If you ask a railfan what they know about the USRA, most will start at the same place — the 2-8-2 Mikado-type steam locomotive. The 2-8-2 wheel configuration had become the standard for freight locomotives following the success of its predecessor, the 2-8-0 Baldwin “Consolidation” type steam locomotive. The 2-8-2 wheel configuration improved upon the 2-8-0 design. As my colleague Lucas Iverson wrote in his profile of the 2-8-2 Mikados:
“(The 2-8-0) had the tractive effort required to drag the heavy freight, but railroads were beginning to look for additional horsepower for the goods and merchandise needed to be shipped quickly. This became the Achilles heel for the Consolidations… The solution was a tried-and-true method from past steam locomotive designs: Make it bigger. Starting with the firebox that (prior to the Mikado design) was a long, narrow furnace situated between the rear driving wheels. Increasing the size, especially the width, would increase the rate of combustion and ultimately the steam pressure needed within the boiler for better horsepower. But to accommodate the larger firebox, it would need to be repositioned right behind the last drivers with a two-wheel trailing truck supporting the heavier weight. The result was a bigger locomotive that ultimately put this new practice in steam technology on the map with advancements still to come.”
The first 2-8-2 locomotives were designed and manufactured by Baldwin Locomotive Works and saw service in Japan before they made their way to the railroads of the United States. This efficient design quickly caught on, and soon after the 2-8-2 configuration was the gold standard. For this reason, the USRA selected the 2-8-2 Mikado as the base template for the light and heavy steam locomotive the USRA would come to produce in the thousands. Locomotives of this design saw service for decades. Though they were eventually outclassed by 2-8-4 wheel configuration locomotives, they saw continued use until the eventual demise of steam railroading.
In March of 1918, the nationalization order of America’s railways was upheld, and the Railway Administration Act became law. William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, was appointed to run the new governmental body.
In November of 1918, an armistice was agreed to between the Allies and Germany (a note of interest for railfans: the armistice was signed at Compiègne in the private railcar of Ferdinand Foch, Marshal of France and supreme commander of Allied forces. Because of a stipulation in the Railway Administration Act, control of the nation’s railroads was to be returned to its original owners, the railways, within 21 months of armistice.
Among the labor force, there was support for continued Federal control of America’s railways. Under the short tenure of the USRA, compensation for labor increased more rapidly than it had under private ownership. This sentiment was not shared by President Woodrow Wilson, which resulted in the eventual return of the railroads to private ownership on March 1, 1920, ending the largest single nationalization in American history.
However, the history of the USRA lives on through the legacy of steam locomotives built to common design.
