News & Reviews News Wire Site of fatal British Columbia derailment has challenged CP for more than a century NEWSWIRE

Site of fatal British Columbia derailment has challenged CP for more than a century NEWSWIRE

By Angela Cotey | February 6, 2019

| Last updated on November 3, 2020

Get a weekly roundup of the industry news you need.

Email Newsletter

Get the newest photos, videos, stories, and more from Trains.com brands. Sign-up for email today!

SpiralTunnelsice
CP maintenance workers remove ice from the walls of a Spiral Tunnel to prevent damage to passing trains.
Canadian Pacific
FIELD, British Columbia – This week’s fatal derailment in British Columbia that took the lives of three railroaders is not the first time tragedy has struck Canadian Pacific’s rugged Laggan Subdivision.

Kicking Horse Pass, home the CP’s iconic Spiral Tunnels and known to local railroaders as “The Big Hill,” has been the site of numerous derailments and runaways in the past century. In fact, one of the first construction trains to descend the grade when it was completed in 1884, derailed along the Kicking Horse River, killing three people.

“This is one of the most challenging railroad territories in all of North America,” says James Carmichael, a senior investigator with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada that is looking into Monday’s derailment.

The grain train that derailed in the early morning hours of Feb. 4 had three locomotives – one leading, one in the middle and one on the rear – and 112 covered hoppers. According to investigators, the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding east of the Upper Spiral Tunnel for about two hours before a new crew took over the train. Normally, crew changes take place 8 miles west at Field. Investigators did not explain why the emergency brakes were applied or why the crew change happened at Partridge during a press conference on Tuesday.

Soon after the new crew boarded the train, it “started to move on its own.” The crew was unable to slow or stop the train, which rolled for two miles before derailing between the Upper and Lower Spiral Tunnels.

According to investigators, 99 cars derailed in three different locations. The lead locomotive derailed on a bridge and fell into the Kicking Horse River, killing all three crew members. According to CP officials, the three-person crew included conductor Dylan Paradis, engineer Andrew Dockrell, and trainee Daniel Waldenberger-Bulmer. All three men were from the Calgary area.

Investigators are currently trying to get information out of the locomotives’ event records to determine how fast the train was going when it derailed. The speed limit through the Spiral Tunnels is 20 mph.

The route over Kicking Horse Pass was first constructed in 1884 and at one point featured a 4.5 percent grade from the Wapata Lake near the Alberta-British Columbia border and Field. Runaways on the steep route were common and at least three runaway spurs were built on the hill. The switches were lined for the spurs and were only switched to the main when an engineer whistled off to inform a waiting switchman that the train was under control.

In 1909, CP completed the Spiral Tunnels that reduced the grade through Kicking Horse Pass to 2.2 percent.

But even with the easier grade, railroading on “The Big Hill” is still a challenging proposition and derailments and mishaps have occurred throughout the decades. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has investigated at least three incidents on the Laggan Subdivision between Partridge and Field in the last 23 years.

In April 1996, a westbound train going through the Spiral Tunnels went into emergency as the result of a loss of radio communication between the locomotives on the head-end of the train and two remote locomotives in the middle of the trains. The train’s air was depleted after multiple brake applications and instead of restoring the air pressure while the train was stopped, the engineer decided to do so on the move. As the train continued through the Lower Spiral Tunnel, the engineer lost control and it rolled for four miles until coming to a stop at Field. No one was injured and no equipment was damaged.

In December 1997, a westbound train was put into emergency near Partridge due to a “series of inappropriate train handling decisions.” The crew decided to restore the air brakes while moving and try to use the dynamic brakes to control the train as it descended the grade. The engineer lost control of the train near the Upper Spiral Tunnel and applied the emergency brakes but was unable to stop. The rear end of the train uncoupled from the head end and 16 cars derailed inside the Upper Spiral Tunnel. The head end of the train continued downhill and hit speeds of 50 miles per hour. Another 50 cars derailed at which point the motive power broke free and the engineer was able to get the locomotives under control and continue to Field. No one was injured. The TSB investigation attributed the derailment to poor train handling, crew fatigue and an unfamiliarity of the new General Electric AC4400 locomotive.

On Jan. 3, 15 cars of a westbound train derailed inside the Upper Spiral Tunnel. The cause of that derailment is still under investigation.

On Monday, CP president and CEO Keith Creel called the derailment a “tragedy” and vowed to figure out what caused a train to derail while descending Kicking Horse Pass.

“This is a tragedy that will have a long-lasting impact on our family of railroaders,” Creel said in a statement late Monday. “The incident is under investigation and we will not speculate at this time on a cause – we owe it to those involved to get it right.”

SpiralTunnelsoverview
Canadian Pacific’s twin Spiral Tunnels near Field, B.C., opened in 1909, reducing the grade to a maximum of 2.2 percent, compared with 4.4 percent before their opening.
Canadian Pacific

20 thoughts on “Site of fatal British Columbia derailment has challenged CP for more than a century NEWSWIRE

  1. If I understand correctly, the reason the train was parked on the grade for 2 hours was because the crew had run out of hours.It’s my understanding that the maximum hours rule is for safety reasons. It appears to me that running for another hour or so would have been safer. Are there no exceptions to the max hours rule, not even to increase safety?

  2. Obviously the first crew ran out of time to tie up before reaching Field. I have operated a similar train but with all 3 locomotives on the head end of the train. The independent brake of three locomotives should have held the train while charging up the train, but not one locomotive. They do not say how many retaining valves were turned on , to control the train on heavy grades.

  3. The standard operating procedure when a train is parked on a grade is this:,before recovering from emergency, sufficient handbrakes must be set to hold the train. After the brakes are set, recover from emergency and pump up the train (I.e. at least 75 psi on the Fred). When pump up is complete, set air- say 10 pounds automatic, then release the handbrakes.
    As soon as conductor is back on board- depart.
    The secret is getting enough air in the car reservoirs to get enough pressure to hold the brake shoes against the wheels.
    You usually only get the maximum of two adequate brake reductions on one complete charge of air.
    Railroad management always tells you to work safely, but when you do they ask: what took so long?
    As it has been said, an accident is always a chain of events. Being in a hurry is almost always on that list.

  4. The crew had train handling issues starting from Calgary. This might be why they were out of hours and couldn’t make Field.

  5. “The switches were lined for the spurs and were only switched to the main when an engineer whistled off to inform a waiting switchman that the train was under control. “
    Engineers “whistle off” when starting from a standing position to indicate that they are beginning to move. In the case of safety tracks, the train is already moving when the engineer tells the switchman that the train is under control.

  6. The Canadian Rockies and Selkirks will continue to be a problem for CP as long as the line runs through. CP did survey a line down west side of the divide to bypass the spiral tunnels after their completion years later that would have provided a easier 1% grade, but avalanche slides proved the survey to be dangerous and expensive. Too bad CP doesn’t have the cash on hand to complete a Kicking Horse Pass tunnel and line relocation, such as they did with Rogers Pass decades ago…

  7. If the train was spotted with the air in emergency it therefore had no air in either the service or emergency reservoirs. Recharging the train line would have released the air in the brake cylinders allowing the train to begin to roll downhill. With no air in either reservoir, the train was doomed. Either the brakes should never have been placed in emergency, retaining air in the emergency reservoirs, or retainers should have been turned up to prevent the cylinders from releasing their air and therefore maintaining brake shoe pressure against the wheels holding the train from rolling downhill until the service reservoirs could have been recharged. Sounds as though this train crew was not sufficiently trained or not thinking.

    I rain trains on the old B.& A. between Albany, N.Y. and Boston, Mass. We had a +1% grade of ten or so miles east bound and a somewhat easier one westbound for around 20 miles over the Berkshires. I would never have taken a train down either of these grades without fully charged service and emergency reservoirs. These unfortunate souls were not thinking. The trains today are so heavy everything must be perfect. When they are not this is what can happen. Very sad.

    Bill McDonald

  8. One thing no one is mentioning is the weather. The colder it gets the more problems with the air. Locomotive brakes alone will not hold the train on that grade. Nor will dynamic. The train had been sitting for at least two hours. I can only speculate that either the brakes leaked off (facilitated by cold seals and valves not containing the air as they would in warmer weather) or they were trying to recharge the air system. Either way there was nothing to use to apply the brakes.
    Until the event recorder on the lead locomotive is recovered it is all speculation. I’m curious about the years of experience of the engineer and conductor. We do know they had a student with them. A lot of new train crews out there with limited knowledge and experience.
    My experience with operating trains between Columbus and Cincinnati with CSX I handled grain trains that were in the 10,000 ton range. Dealing with the grades of the Ohio and Little Miami River valleys one had to be careful when it came to using air and train handling. I can only imagine what it must be like on grades much steeper and longer with a much heavier consist.

  9. “According to investigators, the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied”.

    Brakes equalized and away she went? But, not knowing the details (like whether it was still in emergency, if it in fact was to begin with, when it started to roll or was the crew trying to pump up the air, again, if it was in emergency), I can only hazard a guess.

  10. Sounds eerily like the Coal train Runaway on CSX’s, (B&O)West End 17 mile grade which is 3 miles longer. They lost their Air as well. Don’t know if just 3 Units can control a Train like that in those circumstances, but those are like all GE 4400 HP units so they may be able to. Elsewise they’re doing as CSX did of using Air to supplement the Dynamic Brakes which were not enough alone on 17 Mile Grades 2% + Grade.

  11. Mister Rausch:

    I agree that nobody wants the train on the ground, and also agree that it is far preferable to set hand brakes than to put the train on the ground with a derail.

    But I ask you, Sir, is it not better to put the train on the ground in Field rather than into the river in Kicking Horse Pass? Hence the suggestion concerning a portable derailer.

    The above comments are general in nature and do not form the basis for an attorney/client relationship. They do not constitute legal advice. I am not your attorney. Find your own damn lawyer.

  12. Maybe the railroad should consider having enough locomotives to stop the train over this grade. They put just enough on to get the train over the hill and haven’t learned much from numerous accidents. Should be interesting to see how the rules change.

  13. I expect the carrier, the regulators, the public and probably the crews would prefer setting hand brakes or retainers instead of portable derails so they don’t go on the ground immediately from a derail or later on down the mountain from excessive speed. Few enjoy cranking on handbrakes but even the possibility of the alternative must not be tested.

    I also expect that each conductor and engineer before working “The Big Hill” was told the stories of a couple runaways in the late 90’s and while this particular time wasn’t just like those, the gravity of the situation would be foremost on one’s mind.

  14. Ms. Harding – Sounds like a good idea in theory. Maybe it’s not mandated because of the weight of the things – where would you carry it? In the cab, to be schlepped down and up the ladder? Hung on the side of the loco, where it could freeze in ice? I just don’t know.

  15. Mister Pins:

    Would keeping a portable derailer in the cab, and deploying it on the downhill side before the train (when the train is standing still) as a preventive measure have helped? Just a thought.

    The above comments are general in nature and do not form the basis for an attorney/client relationship. They do not constitute legal advice. I am not your attorney. Find your own damn lawyer.

  16. Does anyone know what the CPR rules say about the use of retainers? Optional with dynamic brakes? Still mandatory under specified conditions? Depending on the grade, what percentage of cars in the train? Where in the train? What position on the retainer?

You must login to submit a comment