LUXOR, Pa. — Service was scheduled to be restored on Norfolk Southern’s main line between Pittsburgh and Harrisburg, Pa., following a Friday collision at Luxor involving three trains that also led to the cancellation of some Amtrak service.
The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reports that one Norfolk Southern train rear-ended another, derailing cars that hit a third train on an adjacent track. No one was injured. The accident occurred about 3:30 p.m. on Friday near Georges Station road in Hempfield Township.
In a statement reported by the newspaper, Norfolk Southern said a westbound train of empty crude-oil tank cars hit the back of a westbound intermodal train, derailing both locomotives as well as some cars of the intermodal train, which were knocked into an eastbound intermodal train. In all, 11 intermodal cars transporting 50 containers were derailed.
A service advisory posted Saturday on the NS website said the railroad anticipated restoring service on the main line between Pittsburgh and Harrisburg by late Saturday night, with traffic delayed 24 to 48 hours as the railroad works through the resulting backlog.
Amtrak’s Pennsylvanian was cancelled between Pittsburgh and Harrisburg on Saturday, operating only between Harrisburg and New York. Sunday’s eastbound Pennsylvanian originated in Harrisburg rather than Pittsburgh.
Don, my bad. I-ETMS can compute the distance from the locomotive to the rear-end-device. Restricted speed is still mostly the engineer’s judgment, though. The speed limit is half the distance the engineer can see, not to exceed 20 mph. The engineer has to gauge the sightlines and the braking ability of the train. Not an easy job.
Referring to engineer Dane Bartkus.. loss of signal indication with cab signals and no intermediate signals online. ie trains that are now becoming monstrous in length and weight on a rollercoaster profile line with much curvature.. I don’t envy your job
PTC is not active on the Pittsburgh line. Crews are still installing new rail with the electromagnetic detectors in many locations along the line. The new SIP cab signals are all active.
The wreck happened in an area of restricted visibility for the following train, a long sweeping curve with well under half a mile sight line. If the speed restriction was 20mph, common on the Pittsburgh Line, the train crew probably did not see the rear of the intermodal until after critical distance. Even full dump emergency brake application wouldn’t slow a 100-120 car train in time, empty or not.
That line has had cab signals since the technology was developed in the 1920’s. In the 1950’s Speed Control was mandated on PRR for passenger trains. Even some K4’s got the Speed Control, but it was not used in freight service, where the engines had only whistle and acknowledger.
That said, the second train was following on a signal requiring restricted speed; either 15 or 20 mph according to the rulebook and able to stop in half the sight distance. Keeping the speed under control would satisfy the cab signals.
PTC can also enforce the speed limit but does not know exactly where the rear of a train is or the visibility/sight lines and thus cannot enforce the “half the distance” rule.
In short, unless you change a “red” block signal to absolute stop and have PTC enforce it, you risk rear end collisions.
There is some irony here; the Southern was once a major user of ATS/ATC. I recall reading that the US Government on/about 1920 mandated that ATS/ATC be installed by each Class I railroad on at least one of its subdivision that carried passenger trains. The L&N installed ATS/ATC on its New Orleans-Mobile mainline, a logical choice given that the line parallel the shores of Gulf of Mexico. Illinois Central installed ATS/ATC on its Centralia-Campaign mainline; diesel passenger trains were permitted a top speed of 103MPH on the district. Southern went beyond the mandate, installing ATS/ATC on its principal mainlines. Foreign roads like the GM&O were required to have ATS/ATC equipped locomotives if they operated over the Southern, i.e., Corinth, MS, to Memphis; Haleyville, AL, to Birmingham; and Bogalusa, LA, to New Orleans. Since Southern’s HQ was in Washington, perhaps they were more attuned to the politics of ATS/ATC.
While driving Rt 322 between I81 and Clarks Ferry Bridge on Saturday I thought it unusual to see 2 freight trains parked on the Buffalo line just north of the Rockville Bridge. One was an intermodal double stack of the type never seen on this line. Now I know why.
William- did not know still no PTC on Pittsburgh Line. Restricting speed rule violation, then?
Phillip- PTC knows where the end of the train is, provided it’s still in one piece. Train consist with weight and length are part of it
Mark, you are absolutely correct. I was with Metrolink when Chatsworth occurred. At the initial meetings at Metrolink, I suggested at least go back to the AAR or FRA and suggest awarding a national contract under with one or no more that two contractors. East and a west split would be ok. Furthermore, the AAR should have overseen and managed the installation of PTC coordinating with the carriers the resources needed for the project. What is amazing is that the old Santa Fe ATC was used until the new PTC system was designed and installed! It is a very complicated system doing many things that are unnecessary. ATC or ATS was proven and ready to go. What the AAR and FRA has allowed is for the railroads to design, construct and install different systems that have to talk to each other. Inoperability was the buzz word. After spending billions,we now have trains still running into each other. What if a passenger train would have been involved? As the project evolved, we have the equivalent if American Airlines and United developed and installed their own way an air traffic control system even if they could “talk” to one another.
Thank God it was an empty oil train…..
Of all the cost and development for PTC, and they didn’t bother to include rear end protection… Just down right stupid…
may be now they will space them feather apart i have notice ns trains are 15 minutes apart compared to a half hour in the past year i thought it was a increase in traffic
I work on that section of railroad as an engineer, and the NS just redid the signal system and now it gives you less time to stop your train at certain places when you need too. Before when we needed to stop, we used to get an approach medium to an approach to a restricting. Now we just get an approach to a restricting.
Waiting for the details on whether the struck train was stopped, what signal indications the offending engineer had coming up on the train in front of him, and how with all the technology we have it could happen.
Mark Kaspar: “railroading is really one big conga line”
Me: Never heard that before but an apt analogy.
In regard to Mr, Messera’s comment on crew size: A third member of the crew, once defined as a flagman, was useful job in averting such rear enders.
The math is interesting without complete info. 11 intermodal cars could be 55 wells hence 110 containers or more if 20 ft containers. If 20Q, most likely 3 pacs hence 33 wells w capacity for 66 domestic containers.
How many times does this have to be said? You can be running with PTC in the active state and STILL hit the rear end of the train in front of you. All the PTC does when a block ahead shows “occupied”, whether it be by another train, broken rail showing an occupancy, signal malfunction, etc, is put up a yellow hashbox in that block telling you to move at restricted speed. Just because another train was rear ended does not mean the crew was running without PTC or that the PTC is not in effect at restricted speed. As long as the “God Box” says “Active” on the screen, the PTC is functioning.
What happened concerning this accident? I have no idea. That’s what the investigators are for.
On the other hand; how many accidents HAVE been avoided by having two people in the cab?
Two folks in the cab is always safer then one? Right.
Fellas – as Steve stated { let’s try to commit this one to memory } “You can be running with PTC in the active state and STILL hit the rear end of the train in front of you.” Got it? PTC may have been sold to schleps like Chuck Schumer as the ‘end all, be all’ answer to the industry’s problems, but as we’re hearing { too bad Washington wasn’t interested in hearing anything while legislating this monstrosity } now – PTC accidents happen & will continue to do so. Why? It’s not sonar based & hasn’t a clue as to where the hind or head end of other trains are. It’s tied into the signal structure. We could ban all movements at restricted speed as a stop gap, but we’d quickly bring the nation’s rail network to a grinding halt { remember – railroading is really one big conga line }. As this was being introduced, I wondered why Washington didn’t simply require all railroads to purchase & install the time proven { almost one hundred years now } Automatic Train Control { ATC } at a fraction of the cost. Seeing that at that time PTC hadn’t even been developed yet, it should’ve been a no brainer – which is right up the politician’s alley…but no…..let’s go with the moonshot & fast. The result? This. Yes, giving an engineer a screen to see several miles ahead is nice & the reminders & inability to run a Form A slow order & Form B work zone { sort of – a story for another day } are benefits to the system….when it’s working. As we’ve seen, the whole gamut is experiencing many ‘hiccups’ and needs further refining. The restricted speed issue, however, will remain as it’s a necessary component of train operations. There simply are far too many scenarios where it must be employed to keep things moving. This is where the rubber meets the road…..the absolute need for railroads to hire only the best individuals to run trains, so when the computer system is down, the human computer can seamlessly take over. A look around the industry shows the opposite is happening. The ranks are being filled with substandard candidates as the carriers are getting their electronic ducks in order to one day replace human engineers with their version of HAL 9000 a la ‘A Space Odyssey’. The future looks bleak.
A question.
Would it make a difference if the crews had an indication of where other trains were in relation to where their train is. I am thinking of what aircraft pilots get from ADS-B.
An example: https://flightaware.com/live/airport/KJFK
A version of the display is available to ensure pilots. It helps immeasurable to keep aircraft separate.
Mr Fehmel I am with you. You an I seem to have the same problem but it’s a lot easy’er to clean up the mess! Seems like there are a lot more rear end derailments lately. Wasn’t PTC going to stop these rear end end wrecks? I thought that’s why there putting this in after that wreck in CA some years back.
Now I don’t feel so bad when I have a derailment on my HO layout which causes the oncoming train to derail, too. It’s just like the prototype.
Did I recently read a report that a similar crash happened because of not being ready/ignoring the Restrictive Speed rule? It’s sounding like the “same old song.” Unless there was a equipment failure, PTC should not have been the cause of the crash. Perhaps more notifications to the humans (two in the cab?) that they are in violation B4 the front end mates with the back end. Although passengers and businesses were denied services, it’s good to know there were no injuries (except perhaps to someone’s pride).