Local train H702, which rammed into 110-car frac sand train, W314, at a control point, was operating with its PTC system in restricted mode at the time of the 5:08 a.m. collision near Carey, Ohio, according to the preliminary report released on Thursday.
“The crew’s first job assignment was to set out 30 empty cars in Carey. CSX instructions specify that for trains operating with active PTC, crews performing pickups, set offs, or other switching activities including shoving movements must: (1) Stop the train/locomotive; (2) Use restricted mode for the PTC system. In restricted mode, the PTC system allows train movement at restricted speed and no longer automatically stops the train before it can violate a red (stop) signal,” the preliminary report says.
After 30 of the train’s 176 cars were set out, the conductor planned to ride a railroad shuttle van to a nearby grade crossing to reboard the train.
“The engineer of train H70211 departed with the PTC system still in restricted mode and continued westbound for about 2 miles to CP Springs,” the report says. “Preliminary event recorder data indicated the train speed never exceeded 20 mph (upper limit threshold of CSX restricted speed rule). The train continued past the red signal at CP Springs and collided with the sixth railcar of the eastbound train W31411.”
The H702’s lead locomotive derailed along with four trash cars. Twenty-one of W314’s frac sand cars, in positions six through 26, derailed.
Both engineers were taken to the hospital with minor injuries, and the crews of both trains underwent drug and alcohol testing.
While under the control of a previous crew, the W314 experienced a PTC failure, which required the system to be disabled.
“The crew involved in the accident notified the CSX dispatcher of the disabled PTC system prior to departing Garrett and were given permission to proceed to Columbus, where the system could be repaired,” the NTSB preliminary report says.
The crew of W314 told investigators that signals indicated their train would diverge from single main track onto main track 2 at CP Springs.
“They stated that they saw the westbound train approaching CP Springs on main track 1 and noted the locomotive headlight was on bright,” the preliminary report says. “The eastbound train engineer said that he flashed his headlight to indicate to the westbound train engineer to dim the locomotive headlight but received no response.”
The ongoing investigation is focusing on train crew distractions, crew resource management, and current railroad operating rules for PTC, the NTSB says.
That old saying “Whatever can go wrong will”
Everything works as designed for the conditions encountered but that does not mean that “Murphy’s law will trump everything”.
Braden Kayganich, If they work 12 hours, they get 10 hours off.
“The ongoing investigation is focusing on train crew distractions, crew resource management, and current railroad operating rules for PTC, the NTSB says.”
Meaning was the engineer texting after he got back on after the set out?
Bob Crowe I would imagine absolute at a end of siding control point.
Was the signal in question in a stop or a stop and proceed designation?
PTC justs adds another level of confusing detail. The system is so buggy that it needs to be disabled in many cases. With it disabled, the rest of the railroad has no idea what the train is doing. Good work!
technology aside, the engineer of H702 passed a stop signal.
Technology is great…..when it works. Luckily, no one was seriously hurt.
I agree Alex.
Maybe it shouldn’t have been implemented as a signal system overlay in the first place, but I get why ditching signalled control points and making some other form of train positioning and track occupancy “vital” was considered a step too far.
Plus nobody wanted to give up the semi security of track circuits to detect broken rails (sometimes).
Restricted mode is the “big hole” in PTC, obviously. This incident exemplifies it perfectly.
Saw a comment below that if PTC is shut off or put in restricted mode, that the rest of the railroad has no idea where that train is – not entirely accurate. They’ll still trip signals, occupy blocks, etc. So the signal system still knows where they are, and PTC is just a signal system overlay right now. PTC really is just ensuring you’re following your signal indications, Form As and Form Bs. Even Form Bs can be bypassed.
Still a lot of holes in the Swiss cheese, as they like to say at the NTSB. But it is progress. From what I have seen, the greatest challenge and first priority right now is to get reliability up, to over 99%. Too many on-line failures right now. We want cheddar, not Swiss!
How does a train go past a RED signal, in the dark, going ONLY 20MPH? forget everything else. Distracted or just plain fell asleep? I’m only being inquisitive, I’m not being a smart ass, I feel like I have to state that here lately.
So PTC isn’t the panacea that the geniuses in Congress imagined it to be? Who would have guessed!
My conjecture Braden, and it’s only that, is that the fatigue issue you allude to continues to get swept under the rug.
Question is…. Did the Hogger doze off? 10-8-10-8 cycles are a killer no matter what anybody says… How about getting better rest periods for crews? PTC isn’t the culprit in this case…
Excuse me 12-8-12-8 cycles.
There is not enough redundancy in the system, thus permitting coincidental failures (including human error/inattention) to add up to disaster. Just my opinion having studied the factors that lead up to critical failures, not as a professional I might add,
Thanks Mr. Bouzide, I thought it might be.