WASHINGTON – Operational changes related to Precision Scheduled Railroading — including a reliance on longer trains — took center stage at a congressional hearing focused on rail safety.
Rail labor leaders and some safety officials were critical of PSR during a House Transportation & Infrastructure subcommittee hearing on Tuesday. But little light, backed up with data, was shed on safety trends in the industry.
Federal Railroad Administration Administrator Amit Bose said he was amazed that the safety watchdog was not collecting train-length data as part of its accident investigations. “We’ve changed that,” he says.
In response to a question from Rep. Seth Moulton, D-Mass., Thomas Chapman, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board, said the board is aware of safety concerns related to PSR operational changes that range from worker fatigue to the makeup of longer trains.
“Those are issues that we would look at in any accident investigation. It’s on our radar…” he said. “We’ve had no accident investigations that were specifically related to PSR.”
Moulton asked whether the NTSB knew whether derailments and train pull-aparts were rising. Chapman was unsure. “It’s striking to me that you would not know,” Moulton said.
Bose said the FRA is looking at operational processes that have changed under PSR, including training for crews that must operate longer trains, the reduction of train and track inspectors, fatigue issues, and hours of service.
Grady Cothen Jr., a retired FRA safety official who is now a consultant, says the trend toward longer trains ignores the dangers of in-train forces that can lead to derailments.
Long-term safety progress has stalled, he says, because heavier, longer trains are being put together without regard to how they are made up. The resulting derailments are often blamed on human factors, but in reality are organizational failures driven by management decisions. Other times wrecks involving long trains are blamed on equipment failures, but he says the equipment fails due to excessive forces that are the result of long trains.
Cothen says PSR is designed for one thing: To reward investors by delivering cash to the bottom line. Congress and the FRA need to provide countervailing pressure on the industry to improve safety, he says.
His third safety recommendation is to mandate phased adoption of electronically controlled pneumatic brakes. They’re needed to overcome limitations inherent in the 1870s design of current air brake systems.
Don Grissom, assistant general president of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, says the number of carmen has been reduced by 15% to 20% due to implementation of Precision Scheduled Railroading. The remaining carmen are pressured to inspect cars in a third of the time required and are expected to turn a blind eye toward defects, he says. Meanwhile, he says carmen often must work 16-hour shifts for five or six days in a row, which leads to fatigue.
Roy Morrison, director of safety for the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division of the Teamsters, says members of his union are forced to cut corners even as railroads want to cut visual track inspections by 80%. Seventy-five percent of track defects, he says, cannot be detected by automated track cars.
But Norfolk Southern Chief Operating Officer Cindy Sanborn says automated track inspections improve safety while allowing inspectors to focus on switches, diamonds, and repairing defects – none of which automated track inspection technology can handle.
The FRA pulled the waiver that allowed NS to reduce visual track inspections in tandem with increased automated inspections. “We are concerned that FRA is not doing everything it can to help develop technology,” Sanborn says.
Bose defended the FRA’s decision to deny waivers that would allow railroads to scale back visual inspections of track while automated track inspections were ramped up. Railroads are free to use automated track inspection whenever and wherever they want, he said, and use of the autonomous cars does not require a waiver. What does require a waiver, he explains, is cutting back on the frequency of visual track inspections.
Moulton criticized PSR for its impact on service and said E. Hunter Harrison’s low-cost operating model doesn’t benefit anyone but shareholders. How, he asked, can railroads return to a functional system that prioritizes service and safety while growing freight volume?
“PSR is a catchphrase for things people don’t like about what’s going on at the railroad,” Sanborn responded, noting she was representing both NS and the Association of American Railroads.
NS implemented PSR principles 2019 and saw its service reach the best level in years, she says. By not switching cars as often and running longer trains with modernized locomotives, NS was able to move its tonnage with fewer locomotives and employees, she explains.
Then the pandemic hit, and NS reduced staffing levels as traffic declined. The labor market changed as volume came back, Sanborn says, making it hard for NS to hire at many locations across its system. NS is hiring aggressively and wants to restore service so it can grow, she says.
Moulton asked what NS was doing to address operational problems related to longer trains, including derailments, break-in-twos, and the inability to fit into passing sidings or yards.
Sanborn says she doesn’t believe the evidence supports that longer trains lead to more derailments. And she says that if NS were to rely on shorter trains, it would only exacerbate the railroad’s crew shortages and service problems.
Crew size, which sits at the intersection of concerns over labor and safety, also drew attention at the hearing.
The Trump administration shelved a proposed crew-size rule proposed during the Obama administration, arguing that the FRA had no safety data to support a two-person crew rule and that crew size has traditionally been handled through negotiations between railroads and labor.
“Safety is not nor should it ever be negotiable,” says Jeremy Ferguson, president of the SMART Transportation Division union. Accidents occur with single-person crews, he says, but data is not collected about crew size.
“Railroads are willing to gamble with safety to improve the bottom line,” he says, noting an increase in accidents and employee injuries over the past few years.
Railroads disagree.
“There is no evidence that trains with one person crews have accidents at a higher rate than trains with two-person crews,” Sanborn says. “While it wouldn’t enhance safety, there’s one thing a crew size regulation would accomplish: it would make railroads less competitive against other modes of transportation who do not face similar operational restrictions.”
During his run for the White House in 2020, President Joe Biden promised rail labor that his administration would enact a rule that would require two crew members in the cab of the locomotive.
Bose says FRA is preparing a notice of proposed rulemaking for a two-person crew mandate. The agency has conducted research related to crew size, he says, and the data will be released when the rule is proposed.
Rep. Dusty Johnson, R-S.D., asked Bose when the rule would be proposed and why the data couldn’t be shared now.
Bose said the data was part of the rulemaking process – and declined to say when the FRA would propose the crew-size rule. He did offer to go over the data with Johnson’s office.
“It doesn’t boost confidence that you’re providing no timeline,” said Johnson, who served in a regulatory capacity on the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission.
The FRA may release the proposed crew rule within a matter of weeks, an agency spokesman says. The FRA has been researching crew cognition and related analyses of engineer and conductor jobs and workload in the cab.
Come November, voters need to terminate the careers of many politicians,
Data is very subjective, no one that doesn’t run trains on a daily basis has no clue how trains handle in the real world. I will bolster all the comments that derailments are way up on the railroad I work for and elsewhere. It’s no coincidence at all. I have a good friend who’s a carman and all he does is fix auto racks with blown out cushion boxes because the sheer tonnage is blowing them out. The equipment isn’t designed for the back office computer generated perfect world railroading these so called experts and engineers think is possible. I’ve dealt with aerospace engineers in my previous job while in college and I’ll tell you one thing when a drawing with a hole is in a place that’s impossible to manufacture they can’t wrap their heads around scenarios like that and I tell you what we as railroaders are dealing with that right now as we all write these comments with the engineers that drum up this crap and think it works because it says so on paper.
In the June issue of Railpace magazine they have a picture of CSX train Q580 on March 20. It had just re-crewed in Buffalo NY. It had 7 CSX units on the head end with no mid train helpers or pushers. Hotbox detector said 866 axles. It was 12,330 feet long , 21,799 tons with 207 cars. It had 27,600 HP on the front end. Oldest unit was built in 1978 and newest on 1996. It averaged 24MPH and could not fit in a single siding. Good PSR. I note mentions of string line incidents with these long trains and improper placement of cars. This video at Kansas junction shows what happens with empty center beam in the middle of a long train. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vFLJvpwm52Q
“But Norfolk Southern Chief Operating Officer Cindy Sanborn says automated track inspections improve safety while allowing inspectors to focus on switches, diamonds, and repairing defects – none of which automated track inspection technology can handle.”
She might want to get together with her other Managers and get out in the field and see what’s actually going on with her company.
James, just in case you forgot your high school constitution lesson, Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3 states, “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;” Train lengths aren’t things that can be easily negotiated; they affect every state and locality with a set of tracks running through it. That is where Congress sometimes has to step in.
To your point of Congress interjecting itself, I agree. On the other hand, if the industry can’t see the issues at hand because of their financial blinders, who will step in and be the arbiter? The railroads are always quick to claim they are regulated by the Federal government.
The Canadian Safety Board has conducted analyses of CN derailments. They found that empty, short wheelbase tank cars were being pushed off the railhead by strings of loaded, long travel box cars. The UP centerbeam/ tank car derailment in KC was caused by excessive buff forces from a mega train coming off the Missouri River bridge. In both instances, the empty cars were pushed off the railhead during brake applications. On a 15,000′ train, the rear brakes are still released by the time the front brakes are set. DPUs will ameliorate that to some degree. However, the complex mix of car types, loads and empties, make the buff and draft forces difficult to mathematically calculate.
The stringline incident in Fostoria was blamed on the engineer. However, the bulk of the train was still on the B&O. As the engineer eased out on the throttle, the empty hoppers near the front of the train stringlined. If you are familiar with the layout of Fostoria, The NE quadrant of CSX to CSX crosses a diamond with the SE quadrant of CSX to NS. The gons up front had loads of ties, followed by 7 empty hoppers. The remaining 9,000′ to 10,000′ was still on the old B&O. The draft forces were enough to pull the empty covered hoppers of the rail.
That was Grady Cothen Jr’s point.
Chris, I happen to be intimately familiar with the Fostoria string-lining derailment. Yes, the empty covered hopper cars were pulled off the NE transfer due to in-train forces. However, a few previously unstated factors contributed to this. 1: The train had been stopped at Columbus Avenue with the air brakes set to minimum application (6-8 psi) 2: When the signal to proceed was authorized, the brakes were released from that minimum application. (This is a problem due to low pressure differential, especially in a very long train of more than 200 cars. 3: The EOT was in communication failure mode. Therefore, the engineer could not determine the status of the air pressure on the rear, but chose to attempt to move the train to avoid further delay. 4: No DP was employed. All power was on the head-end. 5: Rather than “easing” the power around the NE transfer, the throttle was set at a high position, likely due to pulling against brakes that hadn’t fully released.
1. There are may not be a mathematical correlation between train length and number of derailments. However, to the best of my knowledge no one has produced those figures yet.
2. Before people talk about Congressional oversight, someone should specify what Article and paragraph of the constitution they cite as justification.
3. Even if a valid Congressional power exists, it might not be wise. There are certain issues that are best negotiated between the parties. Otherwise, Congress may unintentionally bind into law procedures that can quickly become obsolete.
James-
Try Article I, section 8 (a.k.a. the “Interstate Commerce” clause).
I’ve been following derailments since PSR and mega trains have come on the scene. There is a correlation to a number of the derailments and and train length.
The buff and draft forces in a 15,000 train, even with distributed power, are substantial. Add in infrastructure built in the late-1800s and early 1900s, you have a recipe for string-lining and buff derailments.
Case in point, “Grady Cothen Jr., a retired FRA safety official who is now a consultant, says the trend toward longer trains ignores the dangers of in-train forces that can lead to derailments.
Long-term safety progress has stalled, he says, because heavier, longer trains are being put together without regard to how they are made up. The resulting derailments are often blamed on human factors, but in reality are organizational failures driven by management decisions. Other times wrecks involving long trains are blamed on equipment failures, but he says the equipment fails due to excessive forces that are the result of long trains.”
Charles, you stated you saw a “land ship” on CP with distributed power. Yes, that is technology at work. However, what you fail to grasp is that land ship is comprised of one, maybe two, types of cars. The buff and draft forces on that train are significantly different than a mixed freight.
A mixed freight with multiple blocks will act much different. What do you think the buff forces will be on a string of empty centerbeams being pushed by a block of loaded scrap gons or a string of loaded long-travel box cars? Do you think distributed power will solve all of the buff-draft forces?
And finally, we live in a constitutional republic with a representative form of government. Our elected representatives in congress are the check to the executive branch staff. You state, “The consensus on this forum is that PSR and three mile long container ships on the rails have their issues. That said, Congress can stay out of it.” Quite to the contrary, I want Congress to fulfil their constitutional oversight duty. As you should have learned in school, there are checks and balances between the branches of government.
You do bring up an interesting point Chris, forces.
So many of the rail cars in use today were designed in the 100 car train days and now nearing the end of their designed life are being put in these 15000 foot trains, call it three times the 100 car train.
So case in point, the Berwick forge coal gons that were being used in scrap service now that had the end pulled out of it in the international tunnel between Sarnia Ontario and Port Huron Michigan on CN. Yes fatigue had set in and maybe scrap handling magnets contributed to damage but to pull an end out of a car, have to wonder about design criteria and force.
I agree with these perspectives. Turns of various radii and pitch, small ups and downs based on the land grading standards of 1880, long grades, coupler tolerances based on metallurgical standards for railroads in what, 1926? Welded rail didn’t come out until….. late 1970’s? Do concrete ties absorb rail stresses different than wood ties do? We already know welded rail can’t handle certain temperature cycles as well as jointed rail could.
I am most definitely spitballing here and speaking from an armchair, all were designed for a different era and requirements and if you are running 3 mile long irregular consists and all of these variables haven’t been modeled in say CATIA or some other tool which allows linear programming, then you get into the realm of the unknown when trying to discern how these behaviors came to be.
I would be interested in knowing if *any* railroad actually modeled the stresses PSR would bring to their plant before setting off with their spreadsheets in hand.
Members of Congress don’t know diddly squat about railroading…and the unions are only trying to protect jobs. Look at the raw numbers first, then tell me that longer trains have resulted in more derailments. Broken knuckles(which also could be called break-in-twos) happened with short trains too, so that’s not an issue that was created with longer trains.
Congress doesn’t know the head end of a freight train from their own caboose. Can we leave this to corporate risk management and labor union safety committees?
The consensus on this forum is that PSR and three mile long container ships on the rails have their issues. That said, Congress can stay out of it.
PS Distributed power on these trains helps ameliorate the possibilities of string lining and broken couplers. Not this year but last year I saw Canadian Pacific container ships with power in three places: head, middle and rear. There is such a thing as technological progress you know.