WASHINGTON — A Union Pacific Z-train was moving at 64 mph when it collided with a 45.5-ton piece of heavy equipment on a grade crossing in Pecos, Texas, last month, the National Transportation Safety Board said today.
The Dec. 18 wreck fatally injured the train’s two crew members, engineer Clay Burt and conductor Phillip Araujo.
A review of one of the locomotive data recorders showed the train had been moving at 68 mph before the crew initiated an emergency brake application shortly before the collision. The maximum authorized track speed in the area is 70 mph.
Train ZAILA-18, a Shreveport, La.-Los Angeles hotshot, struck a 2015 Peterbilt truck-tractor in combination with a 2016 Scheuerle hydraulic platform semitrailer that was carrying an oversized load, the NTSB said in its preliminary report on the collision.
The load, a demethanizer tower used in the oil and gas industry, was being transported from Houston to Mentone, Texas, a town in the Permian Basin oil patch 23 miles north of Pecos. The tower was 12 feet wide, 116 feet long, and weighed 91,000 pounds, the NTSB said.
“A single driver operated the combination vehicle, which was escorted by two pilot vehicles and a uniformed police motorcycle escort,” the NTSB said, noting that the Texas Department of Transportation authorized the route for the oversize load handled by Boss Heavy Hall LLC. The Cedar Street grade crossing in Pecos, where the accident occurred, was within the permitted route, NTSB said.
“The combination vehicle entered the highway-railroad grade crossing about 1 minute before the collision,” the NTSB said. “The grade crossing was equipped with flashing lights, crossbucks, gates, and bells. The grade crossing’s warning equipment activated and signaled the train’s approach while the combination vehicle was blocking the railroad tracks.”
As a result of the 5 p.m. collision, the four head-end locomotives and the first 11 stack cars derailed. Some 9,000 gallons of diesel fuel spilled from the locomotives’ fuel tanks.
The collision displaced the combination vehicle’s load, which struck the former Texas & Pacific train station and injured three bystanders in the building, who were later treated and released at a local hospital.
The NTSB said its ongoing investigation will focus on “site modeling, accident data analysis, highway railroad grade crossing safety, locomotive cab survivability and crashworthiness, and carrier requirements for traversing grade crossings while transporting oversize loads.”
While on scene, the safety board reviewed radio logs and surveillance camera video; conducted interviews; made sight distance observations; examined the track, signals, locomotives, and cars; examined the grade crossing equipment and the combination vehicle; reviewed Boss Heavy Haul’s policies, procedures, and training programs; and recovered data from the lead locomotive’s event recorder and external and internal facing cameras.
Operations of moving stuff this big typically have a lot of pre-planning, which would include grade crossing coordination. The company involved here had a post on their Facebook page regarding a similar move and how they worked with the RR’s they had to cross to ensure safety. Even had a pic of the discussed move crossing a RR track. It was posted in early Nov as I recall. Within a couple of days of Pecos they took it down…
Mr. Mulligan, there’s not a sharp curve within 100 miles of Pecos.
Mr. Shingley, no they were not on the wrong road or trying to back up.
The speed of these loads is very slow. When a load slows more when crossing a RR which is prudent the load cannot clear in the time from activation of gates till train passes. Oversize loads need to be required to talk to the RR before crossing RR. That should be required of the front escort.
The front escort should have each crossing ID and telephone number to call. Call a few minutes before reaching RR and get clearance to cross RR. Dispatch can easily set the crossing as fouled until escort call back or dispatch can call in case no call back. If stalled on crossing gives RR time for a quick inspection of the track. Maybe the transport companies need to hire someone who is RR qualified.
Requirements for these type of movements to be stopped and railroad dispatch contacted for approval to either cross or wait should be mandatory of all main line rail lines. Worst case is the truck might have to wait 5-10 minutes for the train to pass. Best case is that the truck would be given approval to cross or approaching trains could be slowed to safe reduced speed in anticipation of the crossing which would still allow for the dispatcher to be notified to stop the train is difficulties crossing the line were to occur. The result in either scenario, no one would lose their life and the damage to property sustained in these types of accidents would be reduced to Zero and only a little inconvenience would be suffered by either party. Being in a hurry in a “damn the torpedo’s, full speed ahead,” fashion can never excuse risking the loss of life (Two lives in this case) or injury.
James, to your third point how would crossing gates know if a truck was oversized unless you go all in on even more sensors, more roadside pressure sensors and so on and then apply to a massive number of at grade crossings in this country.
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I think goes back to a load of this size with the required escorts needing to coordinate rail crossings with the railroad as some of the other comments imply. I had to do this a long long time ago on a construction project for heavy equipment. Yes, it was truly a pain in the arse but when dealing something abnormal & of this size it matters The permitted load having the resources of two private escorts you are already talking a costly move involving a lot of people from the trucking perspective
I suspect the truck was not stuck, but was taking the curve onto the RR sloooowly out of respect for the weight of the trailer and gauge of the trailer wheels.
Each crossing has a blue emergency placard with an ID for the crossing and an 800-number that reaches the dispatcher or similar employee in control of the track being crossed. The DS can give the Police Officer or trucker a lineup of trains, or authorise him to cross the tracks or tell him to wait until a qualified railroad employee can flag the load across.
With this size load and the sharp curve, I might be inclined to require an Operating Employee to flag the move and an Engineering Employee to avoid track damage.
What turn? The road is straight. A goggle street view shows an incline to the tracks. The trailer probably didn’t have enough clearance. These trailers only have a couple inches of clearance
According to the original article on newswire the truck was stuck on the tracks.
If the gates were down 1 minute before the impact, how long was it supposed to take the truck to clear that point? I suspect at the low speed it was traveling through that town it was more than a minute.
It means that much more advance planning needs to take place including contacting the RR before crossing the tracks.
The NTSB has no regulatory authority but they can offer recommendations to enhance safety.
There have been too many oversized load collisions. Regulations requiring coordination with the railroad are long overdue. I hope that such regulations can be adopted.
1. If they had a police escort, how did they get stuck on the tracks?
2. Is this the truck/train accident, where the truck took the wrong route and was backing up and backed over the tracks as the train was coming?
3. Given the size of this over-sized load, should the crossing gates close earlier than they currently do?
James, according to the article, the truck was traveling on its authorized route.
Crossing gates are set to close based in the speed limit for that section of track. That is universal across all railroad crossings. They are activated by the approaching trains irregardless of how fast it is going. Only a human flagging a crossing could halt traffic any sooner as the “gates” are dumb to their environment. When activated, they drop. In this case it wouldn’t have mattered as the truck began crossing without any knowledge of the approaching train which could not have stopped in time in any scenario of a minute or under at 64 miles an hour, 6 miles and hour less than the posted speed limit.