WASHINGTON – Long manifest trains are more likely to derail than their shorter counterparts due to excessive in-train forces – and the number of wrecks related to train makeup and handling issues has increased sharply since U.S. railroads adopted Precision Scheduled Railroading operating models that rely on ever-longer trains, according to a National Academies of Sciences report.
The 105-page report on the impacts of freight trains longer than 7,500 feet recommends several steps that the Federal Railroad Administration should take to ensure that railroads are fully mitigating the risks associated with the operation of long manifest trains.
“Railroad operations have changed a great deal over the past few decades, as have the technologies used and our understanding of the best safety management practices,” Debra Miller, a former member of the Surface Transportation Board and chair of the committee that wrote the report, said in a statement today. “So, the time is right for Congress, regulatory bodies, and the industry itself to take a closer look at railroad practices and regulations to ensure the safest operations going forward.”
The report also urges Congress to authorize the FRA to collect more data on blocked grade crossings. FRA should then work with railroads to find solutions for the most frequently blocked crossings. The safety regulator also should have the ability to levy substantial fines on railroads for blocking crossings.
Finally, the report says that railroads should be deterred from operating freights over siding length on routes that host Amtrak passenger trains. The FRA should be given the power to enforce passenger train right of preference, the report says, and be able to fine railroads when Amtrak trains are delayed because they can’t meet or pass freight trains.
Congress ordered the report as part of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law in 2021. It specifically asked the National Academies to examine the impact of long trains on safety, grade crossings, Amtrak service, and greenhouse gas emissions.
The report noted that there’s no threshold at which a train becomes a “long train” that should be subject to greater safety concerns. As manifest train length increases, however, the number and mix of freight car types and tonnage contributes to increased forces that can stress equipment, create handling challenges for engineers, and increase the potential for derailments if in-train forces are not properly managed, the report says.
“The operational demands of long manifest trains, therefore, require a combination of responses by railroads that includes well-designed and consistently applied train makeup rules, the deployment of appropriate technology (e.g., DP units, brakes, engineer-assist programs), and assurance of crew readiness and competency,” the report says.
All six Class I railroads told the 12-member report committee that the operation of fewer but longer trains should result in a lower number of derailments overall, and that derailments caused by equipment and track should not be affected by train length. And the Association of American Railroads has insisted that railroads have safely operated long trains for decades.
But the report found a positive relationship between average through train size and derailment rates related to train makeup and handling. The report committee also took the AAR to task for not providing full access to derailment data.
“The committee asked the Class I railroads, through the Association of American Railroads (AAR), to provide data on their train operations with sufficient detail to ascertain train type and length for the purpose of more granular assessments of the derailment records,” the report says. “However, restrictive conditions on the data’s availability and use, including a high degree of data aggregation and preapproval of the analytic methods to be used, foreclosed this option.
“Nevertheless, a review of publicly available data on train traffic indicates that the average length of manifest trains has been increasing coincidental with an increase in the rate of derailments of interest,” the report says. “Absent more detailed data, the committee was not able to verify that the operational demands created by longer manifest trains are being fully controlled, and indeed the limited analyses that could be performed suggest that more targeted safety assurance measures may be needed.”
Jessica Kahanek, a spokeswoman for the AAR, said the information the report committee requested would have required significant data aggregation as well as disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Railroads held numerous conversations with the report committee about the data, including recommending use of a third party to analyze and make the data anonymous.
“Despite this, railroads provided massive amounts of data, time and expertise to help inform the review committee on how railroads model, build and safely operate trains no matter the length or commodity mix,” Kahanek says.
The report was, however, able to show the clear trend: Derailments related to train handling and in-train forces began increasing in 2019 in line with increases in train length.
The report also found differences in the long train derailment rates of the big four U.S. systems. Derailments related to excessive in-train forces were significantly higher on Norfolk Southern and significantly lower on BNSF Railway.
“We have made significant improvements in recent years, including achieving a 35% improvement in our mainline train accident rate in 2023. There is no finish line when it comes to safety, and we are continually working to improve,” a Norfolk Southern spokeswoman says.
After derailments related to in-train forces in February and March 2023, Norfolk Southern CEO Alan Shaw ordered train lengths curtailed until the railroad could develop and implement rules on the safe building and handling of long manifest trains. NS says the changes to train makeup, train marshaling, and new software used in terminals has continued to result in improvements. The other Class I systems already had complex rules governing the building of long trains, including placement of distributed power locomotives.
In addition to having more demanding handling requirements, longer manifest trains can create challenges in maintaining radio contact over the length of the train. For example, if a train stops because of mechanical or other issues, a crew member must walk the length of the train and manually set a sufficient number of handbrakes. It is unclear whether the freight railroads have done enough to prepare their employees for these added challenges, the report states.
The FRA should survey the railroad industry for best practices in ensuring appropriate and consistently applied train-makeup procedures, effective crew training protocols, and reliable communications systems for the safe operation of longer trains. Railroads can use this information in developing their risk reduction programs, and FRA auditors can use it for assessing the quality of those programs.
Mark Wallace, first national vice president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, says the report backs up what locomotive engineers have been saying about the trend toward longer trains.
“The report released today on long trains by the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine … provides further evidence of what BLET members have long known: Long trains have a greater risk of derailing, have communications issues, and pose a threat to the public due to blocked crossings, among other issues,” Wallace said in a statement today.
The report did not make policy recommendations about greenhouse gas emissions and the operational fluidity of operating longer manifest trains.
Note: Updated at 9:25 a.m. Central with comment from Norfolk Southern and at 10:17 a.m. with comment from BLET.
Manifest trains contain lumber center beam cars on most occasions. Almost everyone who follows railroading knows those cars are subject to derailment on sharp curves and slack action. The AAR and railroads know this very well. And, there are other long cars as well.
The AAR is a poor place to go to collect information and this report shows it. They are more or less a lobby for railroads. Federal derailment reports are a much better source of information. But, there is one problem with them. They seem to take forever to be completed.
“However, restrictive conditions on the data’s availability and use, including a high degree of data aggregation and preapproval of the analytic methods to be used, foreclosed this option.”
Doesn’t this statement from NAS say it all about the class 1s? They restricted data access, denied NAS raw data and aggregated it themselves and limited analytical methods NAS could use. Why did the class 1s do this? BECAUSE THEY KNOW! The intent is clearly obfuscate and insure that public safety policy makers have insufficient information for decision support.
Having been a quality/reliability statistician for 35 years, I know there is no substitute for raw data. The class 1s limiting data and pre-crunching it amounts to lying.